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OCI No. 0636/65  
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## **MONTHLY REPORT**



DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

# **THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

8 September 1965

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY  
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

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## SOUTH VIETNAM MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

### I. THE SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM

#### A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The mounting undercurrents of opposition to the leadership of General Nguyen Van Thieu and Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky erupted into open but peaceful demonstrations and protest meetings by student elements in Hue and a few other cities in the central provinces. However, unlike similar efforts in the past, the students failed to elicit strong public support or overt encouragement from the Buddhist leadership. Within slightly over a week, the students called off their protest and the government weathered what could be merely the first round.

2. The focus of student protests was General Thieu, the Roman Catholic chief of state, and the government's decree ordering the mobilization of all high school graduates between the ages of 28 and 37. Ultimately, however, the entire government, including Premier Ky, was attacked and some xenophobic anti-American overtones were noted. However, the demonstrators attracted little support from the general populace, mainly because their protest lacked an issue that genuinely affected the man in the street. Tri Quang and some other Buddhist leaders have indicated deep distrust of General Thieu's alleged Diemist background, have criticized the government for promising much but accomplishing little, and have demanded that the civilian government be displaced by a military one; they have thus far however, made no overt moves to encourage opposition to the government. Thus the student movement appears to have been essentially a "probe" and not a serious challenge to the regime.

3. That the GVN handled the situation with restraint, while clearly indicating its intention to act firmly should the demonstrations get out of hand, undoubtedly helped contain the opposition. In the meantime, the mobilization decree was modified to permit a gradual call-up of "indispensable" civil

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servants and technicians, and Premier Ky, while condemning irresponsible opposition, indicated that the government remains ready to accept constructive criticism. The government also introduced certain measures designed at least in part to defuse or neutralize potential opposition, e.g., the investigation of certain senior officers now in disfavor and the granting of juridicial status to the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious sects. Premier Ky also has told Ambassador Lodge that the cabinet has decided to form a civilian council to be selected by and chosen from the recently elected provincial councils, as well as from other groups such as the universities and labor organizations. This council in time might be transformed into a national convention for drafting of a new constitution. Finally, the military leadership reaffirmed its solidarity, on the surface at least, and offered little immediate hope to the opposition that open criticism of the government would split the army.

4. It remains to be seen whether these actions have contained government critics or have alleviated basic doubts over the present leadership. The government has done little toward implementing its announced revolutionary program. Opposition elements such as Tri Quang and political figures currently unrepresented in the government are liable to search out and seize upon controversial issues, confronting the government with the choice of acting firmly or permissively, each course of action having its obvious, inherent dangers. A recently promulgated decree permitting the establishment of military administrations could stimulate charges of dictatorship or, as in the past, the civilian advisory council might focus the opposition and incur the wrath of the military. The unveiling of a land scandal in connection with the newly approved Cam Ranh Bay industrial complex, or the current trials of former Diem adherents who have been held since the November 1963 coup, could provide fuel to critics of the government. While rebellious Montagnard tribesmen have apparently modified their demands for autonomy, it is by no means certain that the military leadership will be willing to appease even their more moderate requests for economic assistance and greater participation in highland administration. Finally, apparent favoritism on the part

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of the GVN toward one religion or faction could stimulate the opposition of the others.

5. Much will also depend on the maintenance of solidarity with the current military leadership, and on its ability to contain both the ambitions of senior officers who have been superceded and those of rising junior troop commanders. On the surface, the leadership appears solid, but there are signs that I Corps commander General Nguyen Chanh Thi aspires to the leadership despite the fact that his support appears limited. He has said, however, that he does not plan to move immediately and that any change in government should be peaceful and orderly.

#### Economic Situation

6. Although the impact of Viet Cong activities on the economy remains serious, there were several significant developments during the month that may lead to some improvement.


7. The embassy reports a new air of optimism in the business community, apparently due to recent effective action against the Viet Cong. Rice prices declined slightly, reflecting the continued ease in this important market. However, the retail price index rose by one percent during the past week, and is 2.1 percent higher than last month. Imported commodity wholesale prices also climbed by 1.1 percent, reaching a level 3.9 percent above last month.

8. Since the institution of MPCs ("script") in Vietnam last week, there has been a moderate upward movement of the US dollar - piaster market rate. The embassy attributes this to expectations of a future shortage of the supply of US "green" dollars to the black market. The higher rate could also reflect the immediate effect of the new system in reducing the current supply of dollars on the black market.

9. On 10 August, the GVN cabinet approved new initiatives in land reform. The GVN land-reform program has been dormant for several years. Several of the new decisions will be implemented immediately. A more detailed discussion of GVN land-reform efforts will appear in the next weekly.

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10. During September the basic sealift capacity is expected to rise to 57,800 metric tons per month, more than enough to meet requirements. Difficulties delaying the arrival of the GVN coastal charter vessels have been largely overcome, and the ships are due to enter service before September 17. The USOM has now signed a final contract for eight additional coastal vessels for a period of from three to six months. These will have a monthly capacity of 20,000 to 24,000 tons.

11. A US Mission working group, meeting for the first time, discussed economic warfare measures such as the denial of certain key commodities, including medicine and salt, to the Viet Cong. It has also been recommended that the airlift of rice, salt, and medical supplies to the highland provinces continue, even if land routes are open, in order to deny these supplies to the Viet Cong. Current airlift capacity is estimated at 3,500 metric tons per month, which is sufficient to take care of high-priority shipments to the highlands area.

#### B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The general trend during August was toward improvement of the GVN military situation. Viet Cong (VC) losses were the highest of the war. Although several large-scale attacks were mounted early in August, by the end of the month the Communists had settled back into a typical guerrilla mode.

2. Viet Cong activities during early August were highlighted by multibattalion actions around Duc Co, Pleiku Province, and at Dak Sut, Kontum Province. The Duc Co action was turned into a VC defeat, but the district headquarters and the CIDG camp at Dak Sut were overrun and destroyed with heavy GVN casualties. The VC committed no such large forces during the latter part of August. Enemy operations during this period generally consisted of small-unit attacks against isolated outposts, together with the usual terrorism, harassment and interdiction. There was renewed attention to Saigon and the delta.

3. The total number of VC attacks during August was 52, the second lowest figure this year. However, five of these were reported as battalion attacks. Terror incidents totalled 1,597, the second highest this year, and comprised about half of all incidents. The Viet Cong lost 4,230 personnel by military action and 1,172 by defection; 1,074 weapons were captured.

4. Interdiction of lines of communication by VC sabotage and road blocks continued to be effective. By the end of the month, National Route 1 was closed in Quang Ngai, Binh Thuan, and Binh Tuy provinces. Route 19 was closed west of Pleiku city, but open to the east. Routes 9 in Quang Tri Province and 7 in Phu Yen and Phu Bon provinces were closed. The National Railroad operated between Saigon and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province; between Phan Theit in Binh Thuan Province and Ninh Thuan Province; and between Da Nang, Quang Nam Province, and Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province.

5. Several GVN operations were significant. Early in the month, the action initiated at Duc Co to relieve the pressure on the besieged garrison resulted in 434 VC killed and six captured. The enemy force was a well-trained and disciplined force composed of a VC regiment (probably the 3rd) plus one Main Force battalion and a composite battalion of local forces. The GVN forces demonstrated an aggressive spirit and a desire to close with the enemy. Their tactics and use of intelligence were excellent. At Long Son, Phong Dinh Province, a search-and-destroy operation was launched by the ARVN 21st Division on the basis of intelligence that a VC battalion was in the area. The prompt reaction and initiative of the ARVN forces involved resulted in 258 VC KIA, and a quantity of small arms and ammunition captured.

6. The most spectacular US activity during August was STARLITE, an amphibious operation in the Van Tuong Peninsula area south of Chu Lai Air Base, Quang Ngai Province, in which the 3rd US Marine Amphibious Force reacted rapidly to intelligence and surprised the VC 1st Regiment. MACV has now validated a total of 964 VC killed, compared to 51 US killed and 203 wounded.



7. Ten in-country high-altitude bombing raids were flown during the month, involving a total of 177 B-52 Stratofortress long-range bombers. Complete results of all raids have yet to be determined. Immediately following the air strike of 15 August (MAIN SPAR) against a VC-controlled area in Quang Tri Province, a multibattalion ARVN force entered the target area. Contact was made with the VC, resulting in a reported 71 VC KIA, 7 VC captured, and 24 suspects apprehended. An estimated six tons of foodstuffs were recovered together with some materiel and equipment. This area, the Ba Long valley, has since remained clear of VC elements. MAIN SPAR was the only strike during August that involved ground reconnaissance.

#### C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

1. No progress in rural reconstruction was reported during the month. There were signs, however, of increased interest on the part of Premier Ky in stepping up the tempo of the program, which has been largely dormant for several months.

2. Recent decrees have altered the structure of the former Rural Reconstruction organization, broadening its scope in some respects. Rural Construction, as the program is now designated, will be under the direction of the minister of rural construction. Although as yet there have been no tangible results accruing from the reorganization, it is the embassy's view that the changes, which in part were politically inspired, may promote a greater degree of interministerial cooperation and coordination.

3. The renewed emphasis on pacification by the Ky government may be in part due to suggestions submitted by the so-called civilian "braintrust" which supports the military Directory. A study which they reportedly prepared recommended that the nonmilitary aspect of the struggle with the Communists be put on a par with the purely military effort. Ky has indicated a desire to revamp and streamline the program so as to make it less

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centralized and more responsive to local conditions. Under proposals recently advanced by Ky, corps commanders and province chiefs would have greater authority for reconstruction programs within their particular areas of responsibility. Ky also has expressed dissatisfaction with the high-priority Hop Tac program around Saigon, maintaining that it presently consists more of paperwork than of action.


4. GVN efforts to handle the refugee problem have been largely ineffectual. The recently created refugee committee of the embassy is organizing itself to be able to step into the refugee program when and where the GVN effort breaks down. There is an increasing awareness of the critical nature of the problem on the part of the GVN. One indicator is a recent proposal that a ministerial post be created to deal with the problem. There are estimated to be nearly 600,000 refugees, concentrated mainly in the I and II Corps areas.

5. Chieu Hoi returnees for the month of August numbered 6,826 persons according to GVN reporting. Of the total, 1,172 were military defectors; the balance was composed largely of civilian returnees, some political cadres, and draft dodgers or deserters. This month's total reflects considerable gain over July's total of 1,854 individuals, including 866 military. Almost 800 of the August total were members of a dissident Khmer minority element who were located in the delta area near the Cambodian border and who had evidently been involved with the Viet Cong.

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# NORTH VIETNAM: SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES



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## II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

### A. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. During August, 11 fixed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites were discovered in North Vietnam, bringing to 18 the number of such defensive missile sites in the DRV. Ten of these new sites are in the general area of Hanoi, suggesting that the DRV is endeavoring to saturate its capital region with defensive missile installations to ensure maximum protection from possible US air strikes. The remaining site is situated 75 miles northwest of Hanoi at the Yen Bai rail yard along the important Hanoi - Lao Cai rail line. The Yen Bai site is in an area that has recently come under heavy US air attacks, resulting in the destruction of the rail line at several places.

2. During the month, two US planes were shot down by missiles from mobile SAM sites. On 11 August an A4E Skyhawk was downed 52 miles southwest of Hanoi, and on 24 August an F4B Phantom fighter was downed in the vicinity of the Thanh Hoa bridge. Neither site responsible for the shoot-downs has been located.

### B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking in their propaganda this month continued to condemn vehemently US actions in South Vietnam. All three bloc powers reiterated their firm opposition to any solution of the war on other than Vietnamese Communist terms.

2. In language intended to convey an impression of unshaken resolve, Hanoi condemned the US announcement on 28 July that the US would increase its troop strength in Vietnam. The regime asserted its determination to fight on for "20 years," if necessary, regardless of the number of US troops sent to Vietnam. DRV propaganda, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the DRV (2 Sept), emphasized the probable long duration of the conflict.

3. Perhaps tied to the realization that the war would be a long and arduous one, the North Vietnamese during the month played up bloc support for their struggle. A 2 August government statement called "on all socialist countries to wage a still more resolute and timely struggle and to extend increased support and assistance in all fields." The DRV sent a "friendship" delegation headed by politburo member Hoang Van Hoan to the Eastern bloc capitals to thank them for aid rendered. Hoan probably also attempted to extract promises of more assistance from Peking and Moscow.

4. The US troop build up in Vietnam drew a defiant reaction from the Chinese. On 7 August Peking renewed its pledges of "all out support" for the Vietnamese and reaffirmed its readiness to send Chinese to fight "shoulder to shoulder" with the Vietnamese people "according to their need." [REDACTED] was reportedly told by the Chinese that there should be an actual departure of US forces before any talks on the war would start. However, [REDACTED] was told that this was really a question for Hanoi and the NFLSV to decide. Soviet statement in reaction to the US troop buildup did not go beyond customary expressions of determination to provide the DRV with "all necessary" assistance.

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#### Negotiations

5. Additional evidence was received this month that Hanoi is not insisting on the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam as a precondition for starting talks--as such--on the war. The DRV ambassador in Havana, in a conversation with a [REDACTED], asserted that Hanoi does not wish to say that negotiations could start only after the withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam. What the DRV insists on, according to the ambassador, is a "sincere declaration" by the US that it respects the Geneva agreements. The DRV ambassador reportedly implied that this involved a unilateral cease-fire by the US, since Hanoi could not believe in Washington's sincerity as long as it continued only to intensify the war. In an interview granted by Ho Chi Minh on 15 August to a Le Monde correspondent, Ho replied to a question

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concerning the conditions under which the DRV would agree to talks that the US must give "tangible proofs" that it accepts the four-point proposal of the North Vietnamese. He called for the withdrawal of US forces, but he did not label it an immediate necessity as he did the ending of attacks on the DRV and the Viet Cong.

25X1C 6. The status of US forces in any settlement on Vietnam was discussed in conversations between [REDACTED] and Vietnamese Communist officials in Moscow. However, [REDACTED] statement that he was told by the DRV ambassador to the USSR that Hanoi is not insisting on a full-scale withdrawal of US troops prior to the inauguration of negotiations on the war has been publicly denied by Hanoi.

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7. Responding to Secretary Rusk's statement that evidence of DRV willingness to approach negotiations would be the withdrawal of the PAVN 325th Division, Hanoi radio denied the presence of the 325th Division in South Vietnam.

8. The first high-level North Vietnamese Communist delegation to visit a Western country arrived for a 15-day visit in France on 25 August at the invitation of the French Communist Party. The delegation, headed by politburo member Le Duc Tho and including the DRV minister of heavy industry and his deputy, is scheduled to hold discussions with the French Communists. Reports from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs have indicated that medium-level representatives of the French Government may talk with important members of the delegation. It is possible that, in addition to its political objectives, the delegation may desire the purchase of some heavy equipment.

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### III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

#### A. GVN VISITS TO ASIAN COUNTRIES

1. Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky's trip to Taiwan and Thailand dominated GVN diplomatic activity during August. The Taiwan and Thailand visits took place at the initiative of the GVN, and were designed partly to further Premier Ky's concept of an alliance of Asian anti-Communist states and also to develop greater coordination and cooperation among these states, and to obtain more assistance for the GVN. Little of a material nature was obtained from either country.

2. The joint GVN-GRC communiqué issued at the close of the Taiwan visit stated that the GRC would increase its technical and material assistance to South Vietnam, and was "prepared to respond to other requests for assistance from the GVN as a contribution to the struggle against the common enemy." The latter reference could be construed to suggest that the Nationalist Chinese would be willing to provide combat forces for South Vietnam.

3. The final joint GVN-Thai communiqué stated that the two states had "agreed to do what they can to develop closer relations," but made no reference to a more formal arrangement. The Thai Government agreed to train Vietnamese pilots in Thailand and to increase the number of medical units in Vietnam, but the Thais indicated that they are in no position to supply combat troops to South Vietnam because of the unsettled conditions in northeast Thailand.

4. Foreign Minister Tran Van Do spent two days at the end of August in Kuala Lumpur as the GVN representative at the Malaysian independence anniversary, and then went on to Singapore for two days on a "personal visit." Plans for additional Asian visits by top GVN officials appear to be far from firm at the present time, but it is anticipated that this fall either Ky or Thieu will visit Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila.

## B. AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE

During his visit to Kuala Lumpur, Foreign Minister Tran Van Do told a press interviewer that the GVN would not take any steps to insure its participation in the Second Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled to begin on November 5. Do stated that he did not believe it was necessary for the GVN to be there, and indicated he doubted that the conference would accomplish anything meaningful for Vietnam.

## C. CAMBODIA

1. At a press conference on his arrival in Nice, Prince Sihanouk endorsed the Communist conditions for a settlement in Vietnam, including cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam, recognition of the National Liberation Front as the valid "interlocutor" of the Vietnamese people, and US withdrawal from South Vietnam. He added that only France can be a mediator.

2. Prince Sihanouk, in presenting medicines to the NFLSV on behalf of the Cambodian Government, was quoted by the North Vietnamese news agency as pledging total support of the "just and legitimate stand of the National Front and the DRV Government," as well as demanding the total and unconditional withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam.

## D. FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE

A sizable number of countries presented or promised assistance to the Republic of Vietnam during August. As expected, Asian nations were the most forthcoming; when the ROK's combat division arrives in South Vietnam, South Korea will have in the country the next largest free world contingent after the United States. Considerably less interest was displayed by countries outside Asia.

### 1. Republic of Korea

On 13 August the ROK National Assembly approved by a vote of 101-1 the government's plan

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to send a combat division and supporting units (totaling 17,354 men) to South Vietnam. The ROK deputy chief of staff for operations and four other general officers arrived in Saigon on 19 August to talk with ARVN and MACV leaders and to visit the area where the ROK division will be deployed. All elements of the ROK combat contingent will have departed for Vietnam by the end of October.

## 2. Republic of China

The GRC has offered Vietnam an unspecified number of LCMs, as well as commercial pilots for Air Vietnam. A ten-man Chinese medical team (financed through PL 480 Title I funds) arrived in Vietnam during the month, and China donated 500,000 textbooks for South Vietnam's elementary school system.

## 3. Philippines

On 23 August the Philippines sent to Vietnam a third civic-action and medical contingent. Consisting of 33 officers and men of the Philippine armed forces, this group replaced the first contingent, which was scheduled to return in late August after a year's tour in Vietnam. President Macapagal has approved the use of Clark AFB for training VNAF pilots to fly B-57s. To meet possible political criticism, a token group of PAF personnel may be given ground training together with the VNAF pilots. The Philippine Government, has deferred consideration of sending combat and support troops until after the Philippine presidential elections in November.

## 4. Australia

Prime Minister Menzies announced on 18 August that Australia would increase its troop commitment to South Vietnam by 350 men (artillery and engineer units) to support the 1st Royal Australian Regiment that arrived in June. The GOA is giving sympathetic consideration to Prime Minister Ky's request for 100 horses to be used in mounted police operations.

## 5. Canada

The Canadians have had difficulty finding aid projects and in recruiting personnel for work outside Saigon; they now have a fund carryover from

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the last fiscal year of \$0.5 million (Canadian) earmarked for Vietnam for which projects are still lacking. A promising field appears to be medical education; Canadian teams may be sent to Vietnam, possibly under Red Cross auspices, to teach medical students and to give advance training to Vietnamese doctors. Sixty to 65 university students will be accepted this year for study in technical fields such as medicine and agriculture.

#### 6. West Germany

The West Germans have had even greater difficulty persuading the Vietnamese to utilize aid funds earmarked for Vietnam. Foreign Minister Tran Van Do has frankly admitted that the GVN Economic Ministry probably sees no reason to use credits, as it believes it can get virtually all necessary aid from the United States on a grant basis. Owing to Vietnamese indecision, half of the \$5 million bilateral development loan fund for 1964 remains uncommitted, and the \$3.7 million commodity credit line (for which a contract was signed in August 1964) remains virtually untouched. Nevertheless, some progress is being made in other fields. A slaughter house project is coming along smoothly and should enable Vietnam to export significant quantities of meat in about a year, and two mobile dental clinics will be delivered next January. If a television station is established, the Germans will probably supply a large number of receivers on a grant basis.

#### 7. Netherlands

The GON is expected in the very near future to assume the full cost of building one of five tuberculosis clinics scheduled for construction in Saigon, and to furnish the necessary staff. A Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs specialist is now in Saigon making a survey of this project. The GON is also actively considering the question of sending a bridge construction team.

#### 8. Uruguay

Uruguay has contributed \$8,000 worth of medicines.

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9. Venezuela

The Venezuelan foreign minister told the US Embassy that his government might be able to contribute surplus rice to South Vietnam. The embassy believes this contribution is likely to materialize; the United States will bear transport expenses.

10. French-speaking Africa

Togo, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and the Malagasy Republic have indicated their inability to extend material aid to the GVN, but have promised to give their moral support through public statements.

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
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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965


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WEEKLY REPORT  
(28 August - 4 September)


## PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)



## WEAPONS LOSSES



## VIET CONG ACTIVITIES




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
# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS MONTHLY REPORT

**SECRET** PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)



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# AIR OPERATIONS (ROLLING THUNDER) OVER NORTH VIETNAM




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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

MONTHLY REPORT  
(through 31 August 65)  
WEAPONS LOSSES - VIETNAM and VIET CONG






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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

MONTHLY REPORT  
(through 31 August 65)  
INCIDENTS - VIET CONG



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10 September 1965

OCI No. 0636/65A

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of the publication,  
The Situation in South Vietnam,  
Monthly Report (OCI No. 0636/65,  
8 September 1965)

SUBJECT : Additional pages

Please add the attached statistical tables  
at the end of the 8 September 1965 Monthly Report.



South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and  
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 August 1965

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period		Viet Cong Inci- dents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	211	116	391	890	1396	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	688	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	205	1327	2016	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1480	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1870	1650	-	232	529	2473	2399	757	973
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	256	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	2223	2143	-	873	548	4065	2781	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	416	77	441	1015	2523	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1862	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	934	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2269	1046	2602	1575	-	540	406	3161	3008	1132	831
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074

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Time Period		Viet Cong Inci- dents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2583	607	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2755	-	-
	1963	1882	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Inci- dents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21153	7195	4237	1270	5701	12882	30896	5195	4049*
1963	17813	5665	20574	11488	3462	3137	4290	20290	28385	8267	5397
1964	28526	7477	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
**1965	17731	7240	18316	14644	-	5777	3546	27661	21872	12278	6531

\*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

\*\*Through 31 August 1965

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 August 1965

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S			Co. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft
		Small-Scale	BN. Size							
1962	1825	528	--	--	--	549	839	180	257	--
Jan 1963	927	242	2		8	252	447	49	179	--
1964	1770	218	3		2	223	1244	129	174	--
1965	2206	57	1		5	63	1489	272	170	212
1962	1460	480	--	--	--	500	613	137	210	--
Feb 1963	788	181	1		13	195	433	69	91	--
1964	2078	211	3		3	217	1389	201	271	--
1965	1982	73	3		6	82	1411	267	91	131
1962	1961	561	--	--	--	588	660	290	423	--
Mar 1963	1282	333	0		11	344	653	131	154	--
1964	2160	198	1		4	203	1632	158	167	--
1965	2056	80	3		3	86	1476	240	90	164
1962	1933	470	--	--	--	497	1024	220	192	--
Apr 1963	1331	371	3		9	383	688	105	155	--
1964	2284	211	3		6	220	1738	169	157	--
1965	1860	38	4		1	43	1407	149	96	165
1962	1825	490	--	--	--	528	892	154	251	--
May 1963	1208	344	0		13	357	608	93	150	--
1964	2143	170	2		3	175	1418	217	140	193
1965	2263	40	11		7	58	1555	365	115	170
1962	1477	385	1		21	407	736	157	222	--
Jun 1963	1311	398	1		11	410	652	107	142	--
1964	2062	128	2		10	140	1390	176	162	194
1965	2597	62	6		1	69	1784	469	103	172
1962	1564	437	1		10	448	735	158	223	--
Jul 1963	1368	398	1		8	407	698	80	183	--
1964	3045	166	12		7	185	2132	286	224	218
1965	2269	37	6		0	43	1526	361	139	200
1962	1642	368	0		9	377	885	146	233	--
Aug 1963	1349	356	1		11	368	647	113	221	--
1964	2580	107	3		3	113	1775	315	173	204
1965	2498	38	5		9	52	1597	349	209	300

SECRET  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S			Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft
		Small-Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size				
1962	1375	382	0	9	624	178	182	--
1963	1763	483	3	17	889	164	207	--
1964	3091	110	4	4	1938	482	178	375
1962	1357	406	1	12	583	189	166	--
1963	1422	363	0	6	802	105	150	--
1964	2827	75	6	2	1790	480	197	277
1962	1311	411	3	7	614	144	132	--
1963	3182	631	3	11	1990	269	278	--
1964	1982	57	1	2	1391	247	109	175
1962	1346	375	1	8	670	107	185	--
1963	1882	258	0	3	1228	111	251	--
1964	2504	81	6	9	1719	318	128	243

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Composite Annual Totals

1962	19,076	5295	41	173	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17,813	4358	15	121	9735	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28,526	1732	46	55	18656	3178	2080	1879
1965	17,731	419	51	26	12245	2472	1004	1514

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